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Abstract
This study aims to identify signalling theory and market feedback theory as
asymmetric information proxies in Indonesia’s capital market to analyse the
relationship between IPO and FiSEO using OLS and quantile regressions approach. The
authors conducted this study based on the idea that it is more meaningful and relevant
to investigate the determinant of the speed of FiSEO at different distribution points
rather than covering the overall distribution. OLS and quantile regression analysis
was applied to 128 samples of IPO companies in IDX during the period 1990–2013.
The results show that signalling theory can explain the speed of conducting FiSEO in
the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). Testing with quantile regression explains that
under-pricing is only able to explain the implementation of FiSEO, which happened
not long after the IPO time (that is up to a period of 3.26 years or Q50). Age as a life
cycle proxy is also able to explain the speed of implementing FiSEO.
1. Introduction
The research phenomenon surrounding the IPO event attracts many researchers. One
of the interesting topics is linking IPOs with the issuer’s plan to do seasoned equity
offering (SEO) (Chang et al., 2004; Hertszel et al., 2012; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989;
Ibbotson, 1975; Welch, 1989; Gumanti and Alkaf, 2011; Slovin et al., 1994; Welch, 1996).
The main reason companies do an IPO is to access the capital market. According to
sequential financing theory, in the period prior to the IPO, the company planned all
of its investment fund needs. Part of the funding needs will be collected through
IPO mechanisms, the remaining funding needs will be met through the mechanism
of seasoned offerings (Allen et al., 1989).
The first seasoned equity offerings (FiSEO) activity can cause the company to
encounter high uncertainties. In relation to capital market conditions, the new publicly
traded company has not been able to fully estimate the efficiency of the capital
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market. Asymmetric information will be greater in markets with low efficiency. Con-
sidering such limitations, the FiSEO issuer should really consider the timing of FiSEO
implementation.
This research was conducted to analyse factors around the IPO event which become
determinant of the speed of the company in doing FiSEO. A quantile regression
approach was used as a complement to multiple linear regression (OLS). The study also
used several control variables such as the quality of underwriters, ROA, the company’s
age at the IPO, total assets of the company, and capital expenditure.
2. Literature Review
There are several opinions related to the under-pricing phenomenon of IPOs, one of
which is the asymmetric information in the distribution of information betweenmarket
participants during an IPO. Market participants with interests in under-pricing at the
time of IPOs are companies, underwriters, and investors (De Lorenzo and Fabrizio,
2001; Al-Shammari et al., 2013). The offering price of stocks in the primary market
is determined based on an agreement between the issuer and the underwriter. As a
party in need of financing, the issuer wants a high initial price. On the contrary, the
underwriter seeks to minimise the risks incurred.
Asymmetric and adverse selection information has been investigated and associ-
ated with many events. Both of these can also be viewed from several points of view.
In the investment field, asymmetric information can be linked to asset selection as well
as funding policy. Asymmetric information, which often occurs in the capital market,
is the ownership of information about the company by managers or agents that is not
owned by outside parties. Based on these considerations, as a manager, an agent has
an interest in providing a signal regarding the condition of the company to stakeholders
including shareholders as investors and potential investors. Potential investors should
know well the stocks to be bought before the investor makes an investment. This
means investors will seek information about stocks in a complete and precise way
in order to get capital gains in the future. Lambert et al. (2012) state: Because of
information asymmetries, differentially informed traders will choose to hold different
portfolios of securities. Therefore, Merton (1987) states that asymmetric information
leads to the cost of obtaining and processing data and costs of channelling information
from one party to another.
Signalling is done by a company since going public, by offering shares at prices
below their intrinsic value, known as under-pricing. The under-pricing of IPO shares
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is indicated as a signal from the issuer to potential investors (Allen and Faulhaber,
1989; Jegadeesh, 1991). This signalling is expected to be acceptable and well perceived
by investors. The signal deployment is done because prospective investors and the
market generally do not know the condition of the company before going public. After
the first day of trading, information about the company will be more open so that the
market will react to the information with amarked increase in stockmarket prices after
trading in the secondary market. Conversely, for the less good companies, there can
be a different market reaction; namely a decline in market prices after trading in the
secondary market. However, the more frequent phenomenon in many capital markets
in the world is under-pricing.
Under-pricing in the primary market is indicated to be the basis for determining
the company’s policy of when it will again raise funds from the capital market. The
under-pricing level is expected to be a reference to the decision of when to do a
seasoned offering. This decision relates to the speed with which companies are refi-
nancing from the capital market since the IPO. Being a public company through an IPO
will increase the company’s access to funds from the capital market by issuing new
shares, bonds and hybrid financing such as convertible bonds, stocks with warrant
and so on. According to Jenkinson (1990), a discounted IPO price will have ’left a good
taste in investors’ mouths’. This impression will be useful to increase investor interest
whenever a company seeks future equity financing. According to Jenkinson (1990), a
company that does not immediately return to the stock market does not under-price
its share price. Supporting the signalling theory, Jegadeesh (1991) and Jegadeesh et al.
(1993) state that there is a positive relationship between the level of under-pricing
and the possibility of companies refinancing by issuing securities or doing seasoned
offerings. Companies that get less funds from the IPO (high under-pricing) will carry
out capital increase more quickly. The higher the initial returns, the higher the trend
of seasoned equity offering within three years after the IPO. Hertzel et al. (2012) even
stated that many companies recognise that the funds collected during the IPO are not
enough to fund the expected investment in the future; therefore, a return to the stock
market is anticipated. This is the reason that staging (sequential financing), despite
increasing issuing costs, becomes a central decision when the company decides to
conduct an IPO.
The theory of market feedback ( Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Levis, 1995; Hill and Hillier,
2007) suggests that after market returns are more likely to demonstrate the possibility
of FiSEO. According to this theory, under-pricing is done to encourage regular investors
to disclose real corporate value information. Therefore, after the IPO, the market will
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3415 Page 695
ICOI-2018
make a correction on the fair price of the stock. If the price formed after the IPO is
profitable, the issuer will consider doing FiSEO for funding needs. The realisation of
the value of the issuer will actually appear on the 20th or 40th day after the stock’s
first trading day ( Jegadeesh et al., 1993). According to Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and
Jiang et al. (2015), the performance of the stock market price after the IPO is positively
related to the probability, speed and size of FiSEO.
3. Methods
3.1. Data
Based on the record of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), there were 128 IPOs during
the period 1990 to 2013 which led to FiSEO. IPO-related information – including the
name of the issuer, asset value, age at the time of conducting the IPO, as well as the
name of the underwriter – is obtained from the prospectus of stock offerings avail-
able at the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and Indonesia Capital Market
Electronic Library (ICamel). Daily stock price information is obtained from Indonesian
Capital Market Directory. The final sample size was 128 companies that conducted IPO
during the 1990–2013 period.
3.2. Measures
The speed of FiSEO is the time interval between the day of the IPO and the FiSEO
is calculated in units of years. IPOs under-pricing is calculated using Market Adjusted






𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝐼𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑚1, (2)
where 𝑃𝑖1 is the closing price of first trading day IPO stock, 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑂is IPO price, and 𝑅𝑚1is
the market returns on the first trading day of IPO stock. The after-market performance
of IPOs is measured by Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) a few days after the first
trading day of IPO stocks. In this article CAR is measured at 20 and 40 days after IPO,
so it is written as CAR20 and CAR40 and calculated using the formula:
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − −𝑅𝑚𝑡 (3)








where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal returns of stock i in period t and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market returns
in period t.
Other variables are used to examine the determinants of the speed of FiSEO, which
are: underwriter reputation (UW), computed as the total IPO value backed by a partic-
ular underwriter divided by total IPO value in the market over a period of time; issuer’s
profitability, measured by the issuer’s ROA one year prior to FiSEO; company’s position
in the life cycle stage, as a proxy of risk, is measured by company’s age (AGE); size of
the firm, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets one year before IPO (LnTA);
and CAPEX, calculated as changes in the net property, plant, equipment of company i
in the IPO year, compared to the previous year.
OLS and quantile regressions are used in testing the relationship between initial
returns and after market performance, as well as the determinants of the speed of
FiSEO, using the following model:
SPEED𝐹𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑅20𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑅40𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑊 𝑖,𝑡
+𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−−1 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,
(5)
We use the quantile regressions developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and
Koenker (2005). This method was chosen with the consideration that the OLS regres-
sion may not be appropriate in dealing with extreme values and outliers in the distri-
bution of the dependent variables. By using OLS some interest groups may be ignored.
Estimation with quantile regressions as a complement to ordinary least square regres-
sion gives an opportunity to compare the marginal effect of independent variables
across the conditional distribution of dependent variables. In addition, better than OLS
regression, the estimated coefficients of the quantile regression are not sensitive to
outliers of the dependent variable.
Considering (𝑦𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) i = 1,......, N is a sample derived from a population, where 𝑥𝑖 is
a Z × 1 vector of independent variables and 𝑦𝑖 represents the dependent variable, a
quantile regression model is specified as follows:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽(𝑞) + 𝜖𝑖(𝑞) (6)
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For a given quantile of 0 < q < 1 the value of 𝛽(𝑞) is obtained by minimising the average
weighted distance of 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦′𝑖 as follows:















4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive
Table 1 shows descriptions of 128 IPO companies for the period 1990–1913. Themean of
MAIR (market adjusted initial returns) during the study period is 22.64% (t-stat 7.402).
The positive average value of initial returns in the Indonesian equity market is the
same as in many world capital markets where, on average, the closing price on the
first trading day is higher than the stock’s offering price at IPO, that is, under-pricing.
Indonesian firms go public on average at the age of 16.14 years, with a standard
deviation of 14.12. This shows that the company’s age range in Indonesia when con-
ducting IPO is very wide; from two to 30 years. This enormous age difference of
corporations is unique in the Indonesian capital market, given that many studies show
that the firm’s age will affect risk (Ritter, 1984; Hensler et al., 1997; and Shultz, 1993).
T 1: Descriptive for IPO companies.
Descriptive
Variable Q1 Median Q3 Mean Standard
Deviation
MAD Min. Max.
MAIR (%) 1.5728 6.4536 25.8047 22.6438 49.7767 10.1701 –69.0842 254.1755
CAR20 (%) –2.6071 10.1989 34.0575 27.3993 56.8294 21.5603 –59.6422 249.3739
CAR40 (%) –8.0776 1.9719 10.1648 2.3687 17.7945 13.0271 –57.8903 65.2892
UW (%) 1.1484 2.7091 6.7634 6.3525 9.2787 2.6261 0.0604 46.3239
ROA (%) 1.6678 4.3468 8.5084 4.532 9.72 4.3358 –50.1474 43.3702
AGE (Years) 8.0753 13.0877 19.3233 16.1447 14.124 8.2863 2.1479 85.4438
LnTA 24.5785 25.5965 26.7573 25.6002 2.6079 1.5333 23.0289 30.2459
CAPEX 0.0338 0.236 0.9781 1.367 4.7297 0.4 –0.5778 37.5528
SPEED
(Years)
2.2849 3.2603 6.7712 5.256 4.9374 2.4534 0.8959 25.2356
LNSPEED 0.7952 1.1805 1.9126 1.3195 0.797 0.7638 –0.1099 3.2283
The average speed of the company performing FiSEO is 5.26 years, with a standard
deviation of 4.94 and a median of 3.26. This large standard deviation suggests that
although some companies are refinancing in the stock market in less than a year, there
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are also some which return after more than 10 years. In general, it can be said that the
time range to conduct refinancing from the stock market is quite long for Indonesian
companies.
Table 2 shows there are three variables that are able to explain the speed of per-
forming FiSEO, that is, MAIR, Age, and ROA. MAIR, which is a measure for signalling
theory, which can explain FiSEO better than CAR 20 and CAR 40, which are the proxy
of market feedback theory. Quantile analysis shows that MAIR is able to explain FiSEO,
which is implemented up to 3.26 years post IPO (Q50). These results indicate that the
initial returns are still relevant in considering the decision of FiSEO for a period of less
than four years. After that period the initial returns are no longer relevant, as indicated
by its insignificant influence on the FiSEO decision. This is due to the increasing amount
of material information released in the market, with the increasing distance of time
from the time of IPO.
T 2: Regression result for speed of FiSEO.
OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
(Constant) 1.3257** 0.2500 0.3753 1.8883 4.0349 3.8279
(2.20) (0.36) (0.47) (1.53) (1.55) (1.12)
MAIR 0.0040** 0.0068** 0.0056* 0.0059** 0.0019 –0.0002
(2.20) (2.48) (2.67) (2.55) (0.80) (–0.06)
CAR20 –0.0009 –0.0005 –0.0016 –0.0027 –0.14 –0.0003
(–0.64) (–0.25) (–1.11) (1.36) (0.889) (–0.08)
CAR40 –0.00161 –0.0010 –0.0032 –0.0050 0.0000 –0.0020
(–0.42) (–0.13) (–0.56) (1.03) (0.00) (–0.33)
UW –0.0026 0.0071 0.0012 –0.0017 0.0061 0.0030
(–0.33) (0.36) (0.11) (–0.17) (0.43) (0.12)
ROA 0.0159** 0.0037 0.0096 0.0189*** 0.0177 0.0289
(2.24) (0.31) (0.89) (1.68) (1.33) (1.55)
AGE 0.0152*** 0.0153*** 0.0131** 0.0176** 0.0185** 0.0108
(3.07) (1.93) (2.00) (2.27) (2.19) (0.94)
LnTA –0.0141 –0.0082 0.0035 –0.0419 –0.1047 –0.0696
(–0.54) (–0.32) (0.11) (–0.87) (–1.00) (–0.50)
CAPEX –0.00509 –0.0028 0.0077 –0.0039 –0.0179 0.0050
(–0.35) (–0.05) (0.17) (–0.14) (–0.28) (0.04)
Table 2 reports the results from OLS and quantile regressions of LnSpeed during the
period 2009–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2 also shows that age affects the speed of FiSEO up to Q75 or 8.6 years from
the IPO time. The ability of an age to explain the speed of doing FiSEO even up to 8.6
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years from IPO time is due to age. As described in many studies, age is a proxy of risks
(Ritter, 1984; Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 1997; and Shultz, 1993). The older the
company’s age, the more experience, so that the possibility of failure is smaller. The
relationship between age and initial returns along the quantile of dependent variables
is consistent with the prediction, which is increasing in line with the quantile. The
results of this study also support previous findings related to the age relationship with
the speed of FiSEO (Meidiaswati, 2017), where the age of the company at the time of
IPO consistently has a positive effect on the speed of FiSEO. The results of this test
indicate that with the approach of quantile regression the speed of FiSEO can prove
the signal theory applies in the Indonesian capital market. This proof is obtained using
the initial returns, as measured by MAIR.
ROA, as a measure of profitability, affects the speed of FiSEO in testing with OLS.
However, the tests with quantile regression found the only relationship of the two
variables in Q50. These results indicate that the consistency of ROA as a firm speed
predictor of FiSEO is very weak.
5. Conclusion
This study aims to identify the relationship between initial returns and after market
performance and the speed of the FiSEO of IPOs in the Indonesian Stock Exchange
during the period 1990–2013. In addition to looking for these relationships, the study
also investigates control variables such as UW, ROA, age, total assets, and CAPEX. To
get a better explanation, the analysis was done using OLS and quantile regressions
methods.
Tests with quantile regressions explain that under-pricing can only happen to imme-
diate FiSEO, that is, up to a period of 3.26 years post IPO (Q50). This can happen because
with a longer IPO and FiSEO time span, initial returns are no longer relevant when
considering FiSEO decisions, as more information can affect FiSEO decisions. Age as
a life cycle proxy can explain the implementation of FiSEO up to 6.8 years post IPO
period (Q75). Age affects the decision of FiSEO for a longer period of time because
age, asmentioned inmany studies, is a proxy risk (Ritter, 1984; Hensler, Rutherford and
Springer, 1997; Shultz, 1993). The older the company’s age, the more experience, so
that the possibility of failure is smaller. The results of this study also support previous
findings related to the age relationship with the speed of FiSEO (Meidiaswati, 2017),
where the age of the company at the time of IPO consistently has a positive effect on
the speed of FiSEO.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3415 Page 700
ICOI-2018
References
[1] Al-Shammari, H., O’Brien, A., Ross, W., et al. (2013). Firm internationalization and IPO
firm performance: Themoderating effects of firm ownership structure. International
Journal of Commerce and Management, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 242–261.
[2] Allen, F. and Faulhaber, G. R. (1989). Signaling by underpricing in the IPO market.
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 303–323.
[3] Chang, S., Chen, S., and Yichen Liu, Y. (2004). Why firms use convertibles: A Fuerher
test of the sequential-financing hypothesis. Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 28, pp.
1163–1183.
[4] De Lorenzo, M. and Fabrizio, S. (2001). Asymetric information and the role of
underwriter. The prospectus and the analyst in underpricing of IPO. The Italian Case.
Social Science Research Network.
[5] Fernando, C. S., Gatchev, V. A., and Spindt, P. A. (2005). Wanna dance? How firms
and underwriters choose each other. Journal of Finance, vol. 60, pp. 2437–2469.
[6] Gumanti and Alkaf. (2011). Underpricing Dalam Penawaran Saham Perdana Dan
Penawaran Saham Susulan. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 21–35.
[7] Hensler, D., Rutherford, R., and Springer, T. (1997). The survival of initial public
offerings in the aftermarket. Journal of Financial Research, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 93–110.
[8] Hertszel, M. G., Huson, M. R., and Parrino, R. (2012). Public market staging: The
timing of capital infusions in newly public firms. Journal of Finance Economics, vol.
106, pp. 72–90.
[9] Hill, P., and Hillier, D. (2009). Market feedback, investment constraints, and
managerial behavior. European Financial Management, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 584–605.
[10] Ibbotson, R. G. (1975). Price performance of common stock new issues. Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 2, pp. 235–272.
[11] Jegadeesh, N. (1991). Seasonality in stock price mean reversion: Evidence from the
US and UK. Journal of Finance, vol. 46, pp. 1427–1444.
[12] Jegadeesh, N., Weinstein, M., and Welch, I. (1993). An empirical investigation of IPO
returns and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 34, no.
2, pp. 153–175.
[13] Jenkinson, T. J. (1990). Initial public offerings in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Japan. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 4, pp.
428–449.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3415 Page 701
ICOI-2018
[14] Jiang, Y., Stohs, M., and Xie, X. (2015). The early bird gets the worm? The stock
returns and operating performance of quick SEOs. International Journal of Business,
vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1083–4346.
[15] Koenker, R. and Bassett, Jr., G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica, vol. 46,
pp. 33–50.
[16] Koenker, R. and Hallock, K. F. (2001). Quantile regression. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 143–156.
[17] Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile Regression. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[18] Lambert, R. A., Leuz, C., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2012). Information asymmetry,
information precision, and the cost of capital. Review of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.
1–29.
[19] Levis, M. (1995). Seasoned equity offerings and the short-run and long-run
performance of initial public offerings in the UK. European Financial Management,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 125–146.
[20] Meidiaswati, H. (2017). Asymmetric Information at First Seasoned Equity Offering
in the Indonesian Capital Market. Dissertation, Postgraduate Program, the Faculty
of Economics and Business, Universitas Airlangga.
[21] Merton, R. C. (1987). A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete
information. The Journal of Finance, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 483–510.
[22] Ritter, J. R. (1984a). The hot issue market of 1980. The Journal of Business, vol. 57,
no. 2, pp. 215–240.
[23] . (1984b). Signaling and the valuation of unseasoned new issues: A
comment. Journal of Finance, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1231–1237.
[24] Shultz, P. (1993). Unit initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 34,
no. 2, pp. 199–299.
[25] Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E., and Bendeck, Y. M. (1994). Seasoned common stock
issuance following an IPO. Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 18, pp. 207–226.
[26] Welch, I. (1989). Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial
public offerings. Journal of Finance, vol. 44, pp. 421–449.
[27] . (1996). Equity offering following the IPO theory and evidence. Journal of
Corporate Finance, vol. 2, pp. 227–259.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3415 Page 702
